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Kotkin: Grandparents Versus the State: A Constitutional Right to Custody

NOTES

GRANDPARENTS VERSUS THE STATE: A
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO CUSTODY
INTRODUCTION

Grandparents often assume responsibility for their grandchildren when the natural parents are no longer present. Whether they
have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in the care and custody of their grandchildren in such situations is unclear. Indeed, the
states that have examined this issue have come to differing conclusions as to whether grandparents may claim a preferential constitutionally protected interest in obtaining custody of their grandchildren. This Note examines the question in light of New York law,
which holds that grandparents have no preferential right to the custody of their grandchildren.
In July, 1983, the New York Court of Appeals, in In re Peter
L.,' denied custody of Peter, a five year old child, to his paternal
grandmother. Peter's grandmother sought custody after the child's
father died and his mother surrendered custody to the Commissioner
of Social Services.2 The court of appeals reinstated the family court
decision, 3 which had found that such a placement would not be in
the best interests of the child, 4 and ordered Peter placed in a suitable
1. 59 N.Y.2d 513, 453 N.E.2d 480, 466 N.Y.S.2d 251 (1983).
2. Id. at 517, 453 N.E.2d at 481, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 252.
3. The family court decision is unpublished and remains unavailable to the public. See
N.Y. Fain. Ct. Act § 166 (McKinney 1983) (records of any family court proceedings are not
open to indiscriminate public inspection). As a result, all references herein to the contents of
the family court decision emanate from the New York Appellate Division (In re Peter L., 92
A.D.2d 853, 460 N.Y.S.2d 578 (1983)) and Court of Appeals (In re Peter L., 59 N.Y.2d 513,
453 N.E.2d 480, 466 N.Y.S.2d 251 (1983)) decisions.
4. As reported in In re Peter L., 59 N.Y.2d 513, 518, 453 N.E.2d 480, 481, 466
N.Y.S.2d 251, 252 (1983).
In general, the courts consider the social, psychological, spiritual, and economic environment of the home in question and the character of the people seeking custody, in deciding
whether a placement is in the best interests of the child. In addition, the court may consider
the mental and physical health of the child, as well as the type of home, the neighborhood, and
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adoptive home.5 The family court had admitted that the grandmother was fit to have custody, and stated that if she had been the
natural mother, Peter would have been released to her.' Nevertheless, the family court stated that, as a grandmother, she had "no
greater legal right to the child than any stranger,"'7 and ordered that

the boy be placed in an as yet undetermined home."
The appellate division unanimously overturned the family court
decision." The appellate court found that custody by the grandthe religious and educational opportunities that will be available to the child. See Foster &
Freed, Child Custody (Pt. 1), 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 423, 438-43 (1964). See also COMMITTEE ON
THE FAMILY OF THE GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, NEW TRENDS IN CHILD

CUSTODY DETERMINATIONS 22-56 (1980); 2 J. MCCAHEY, M. KAUFMAN, C. KRAUT, D.
GAFFNER, M. SILVERMAN & J. ZETT,CHILD CUSTODY & VISITATION LAW AND PRACTICE 1 1-

7 to 11-10 (1983) [hereinafter citied as MCCAHEY & ZETT].
In New York, the child's best interests are not determined by who would make a "better"
parent or provide the child with more material comforts. Bennett v. Jeffreys, 40 N.Y.2d 543,
549, 356 N.E.2d 277, 283, 387 N.Y.S.2d 821, 826 (1976). The court will, however, consider
the stability of the household and "any other circumstances bearing upon the fitness or adequacy of a child's custodian." Id. at 552, 356 N.E.2d at 285, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 828.
5. As reported in In re Peter L., 59 N.Y.2d 513, 518, 453 N.E.2d 480, 481, 466
N.Y.S.2d 251, 252 (1983). The family court's finding that placement with the grandmother
would not be in Peter's best interest centered around what it perceived to be her overprotective
attitude toward the child. As reported in In re Peter L., 92 A.D.2d 853, 854, 460 N.Y.S.2d
578, 579, rev'd, 59 N.Y.2d 513, 453 N.E.2d 480, 466 N.Y.S.2d 251 (1983). The family court
was also disturbed by the grandmother's mourning practices which were rooted in old world
Greek traditions. Her son had been killed by street violence, and the grandmother, a woman of
Greek heritage, apparently told her grandson that he had a duty, when he grew up, to avenge
his father's death. Moreover, the grandmother pinned a photograph of the child's father on the
boy's lapel so that he would remember him, and had a picture of the father in his casket, on
the dining room wall. A Greek psychologist explained that these practices were traditional
Greek mourning customs, and generally were not detrimental to a child's development. Based
upon these mourning practices and the Social Services Department's portrayal of the grandmother as a lonely, embittered woman, the court found that she would not provide a proper
environment for the boy. Id. at 854-55, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 579-80.
6. As reported in In re Peter L., 92 A.D.2d 853, 854, 460 N.Y.S.2d 578, 579, rev'd, 59
N.Y.2d 513, 453 N.E.2d 480, 466 N.Y.S.2d 251 (1983).
7. Id. at 854, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 579.
8. Id. at 853, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 579. The foster parents with whom Peter had been living
did not wish to adopt him. As reported in In re Peter L., 59 N.Y.2d 513, 517 n.3, 453 N.E.2d
480, 481 n.3, 466 N.Y.S.2d 251, 252 n.3 (1983).
For two of the three years of Peter's life prior to his placement in foster care, Peter had
lived with his grandmother and father at his grandmother's home. After an argument between
Peter's father and grandmother, the father had taken Peter and moved to Peter's aunt's home.
The aunt voluntarily placed Peter in foster care, without the grandmother's knowledge. The
father died before Peter could be returned to his custody. Ten days after his death, Peter's
mother transferred custody to the Commissioner of Social Services. Throughout the entire
period that Peter was in foster care, Peter and his grandmother had visited together extensively. See Respondent's Brief at 3-4, In re Peter L., 59 N.Y.2d 513, 453 N.E.2d 480, 466
N.Y.S.2d 251 (1983).
9. In re Peter L., 92 A.D.2d 853, 460 N.Y.S.2d 578, rev'd, 59 N.Y.2d 513, 453 N.E.2d
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mother would be in Peter's best interest, and stated that the family

court had overlooked a number of factors indicating that the grandmother would provide an appropriate family environment for the
boy.' 0 It pointed to the great love the grandmother and child had for
each other and to the recommendation by Peter's law guardian that
Peter's interests would best be served by placement with the grandmother." As a result, the appellate court awarded custody to Peter's

grandmother.' 2 The court of appeals, however, reversed and reinstated the family court's decision. 13 The court reiterated the family

court's view, noting that members of the extended family of a child
who has been surrendered to an authorized agency for the purpose of
adoption have no special nonconstitutional right to custody of the

child which permits them to override a decision by the agency.' 4
The question of whether the grandmother did indeed have any
constitutionally protected rights in this situation was not decided by
the court of appeals, 15 despite the grandmother's assertion that she

had a constitutionally protected liberty interest in the child and a
"fundamental, constitutional, substantive due process right to [his]
480, 466 N.Y.S.2d 251 (1983).
10. Id. at 854-55, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 579-80.
11. Id. The court also pointed to the fact that a paternal aunt and her husband would
provide a back-up family resource for Peter by visiting him weekly with their child. Moreover,
the court accepted the Greek mourning practices as part of the child's heritage, and pointed to
the fact that the grandmother was willing to accept Human Resources Service (Bureau of
Child Welfare) counseling to help her provide her grandson with an appropriate home setting.
Id.
12. Id. at 853, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 578.
13. In re Peter L., 59 N.Y.2d 513, 453 N.E.2d 480, 466 N.Y.S.2d 251 (1983).
14. Id. at 516, 453 N.E.2d at 480, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 251. The court reinstated the family
court decision on procedural grounds, stating that the disposition by the appellate division was
not statutorily authorized in a proceeding brought under § 392 of the New York Social Service
Law. Id. at 518, 453 N.E.2d at 482, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 253. The court held that under that
section, the appellate division could only have directed that Peter's foster care be continued or
that he be placed for adoption. 59 N.Y.2d at 519, 453 N.E.2d at 482, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 253.
See N.Y. Soc. SaRv. LAW § 392(7)(a),(d) (McKinney 1983). It stated, however, that the
appellate court's resolution, which vested custody in the grandmother, was impermissible and
left Peter "in a state of limbo." Id.
In addition, the court noted that the grandmother's position "was at best no better than
that of [a] short-term foster parent," whom the court asserted faces a "virtually impossible
task" in seeking to retain custody since he or she "must demonstrate not only that [he or she]
would make [a] suitable adoptive parent, but, rather, that [he or she] would provide a better
adoptive home than that planned by the department or agency." Id. at 520, 453 N.E.2d at
483, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 254 (quoting People ex rel. Ninesling v. Nassau County Dep't of Social
Servs., 46 N.Y.2d 382, 389, 386 N.E.2d 235, 239, 413 N.Y.S.2d 626, 631 (1978)).
15. The court determined that the grandmother's constitutional argument was unavailable because it was "not tendered in Family Court and not relied on or addressed by the Appellate Division." 59 N.Y.2d at 519, 453 N.E.2d at 482, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 253.
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custody."' 16 It was the grandmother's contention that, in light of such
a constitutionally protected interest, she had a preemptive right entitling her to preference over strangers who might seek to adopt her
grandson.' 7 She further contended that it was an unconstitutional
intrusion into the family unit for the state to break up a family
where there was a fit relative willing to assume custody.' 8
This Note addresses the merit of these constitutional assertions.
While the outcome of the Peter L. case itself is final, the questions it
raises regarding custody rights and the extended family are far from
settled.' 9 Moreover, if the grandmother's contentions are valid and
grandparents do have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in
the care and custody of their "parentless" grandchildren, then the
16. Id. The liberty interest asserted by the grandmother is not one of the rights specifically enumerated in the Bill of Rights. See Note, The FundamentalRight to Family Integrity
and its Role in New York Foster Care Adjudication, 44 BROOKLYN L. REv. 63, 70 (1977).
Rather, it stems from the guarantee of the fourteenth amendment that "no State shall..,
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1. See Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977); Cleveland Bd.
of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,
534-35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-401 (1923).
While the liberties thus guaranteed are not precisely defined anywhere in the Constitution, the Supreme Court has enumerated a number of "fundamental" rights that may claim
protection under the fourteenth amendment. They include:
not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to
contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful
knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges
long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by
free men.
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
In the area of personal privacy, the Court has recognized as fundamental the right to
marry, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967), the right to purchase contraceptives, Carey
v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1977) and the right to decide to have an
abortion, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973).
The right to family integrity - i.e. the right of a family to live together without undue
interference by the state - has repeatedly been recognized by the Supreme Court in a variety
of contexts. See infra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
17. See Brief for Respondent at 13-24, In re Peter L., 59 N.Y.2d 513, 453 N.E.2d 480,
466 N.Y.S.2d 251 (1983).
18. See Brief for Respondent at 24, In re Peter L., 59 N.Y.2d 513, 453 N.E.2d 480, 466
N.Y.S.2d 251 (1983).
19. This Note deals strictly with the rights of grandparents, as opposed to other members of the extended family. How far and to whom the United States Supreme Court should
extend constitutional protection beyond the grandparents is not within the scope of this Note.
For a discussion regarding the extension of the liberty interest to foster parents, see Note,
ConstitutionalLaw - Due Process - Family Law Family Interest of Foster Parents, 1978
Wis, L. Rev. 510.
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standards used by the New York courts 20 in making placement decisions in such situations will have to be reevaluated to ensure that
their procedures are constitutionally sound.2 '
This Note begins by discussing the evolution of the natural parent's liberty interest, which has been afforded both substantive and
procedural due process protection. 2 Next, it examines the extent to

which the United States Supreme Court has expanded this liberty
interest concept to afford constitutional due process protection to
members of the extended family. In light of such potential rights,
this Note examines the statutory scheme and the standards used in

New York custody determinations when neither natural parent is a
party to the proceedings and a grandparent challenges the state's
adoption plan for his or her grandchild. Finally, this Note demonstrates that New York places an unconstitutionally heavy procedural

burden on grandparents by denying them a presumptive or preferen20. This Note examines the placement practices and procedures in the context of New
York law. However, the conclusions drawn herein regarding the familial liberty interest can
apply to any jurisdiction that fails to recognize the presumptive claims of grandparents to the
care and custody of their parentless grandchildren. See, e.g., Browder v. Harmeyer, 453
N.E.2d 301 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983) (grandparents do not have a recognized preferential interest
in or rights to their grandchildren); Cox v. Stayton, 273 Ark. 298, 619 S.W.2d 617 (1981)
(grandparents have no rights to their grandchildren under the Constitution).
21. In New York, once parental rights have been terminated, there is generally no presumption that the best interests of the child will be promoted by any particular disposition. See
infra notes 23, 155 and accompanying text.
22. Substantive due process stems from the notion that certain types of lawmaking exceed any appropriate scope of government activity. As a result any life, liberty or property
interest that is limited by such lawmaking is "taken without due process because the Constitution never granted the government the ability to pass such a law." J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA &
J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 418 (2d ed. 1983) [hereinafter cited as NOWAK & YOUNG].
Substantive review, therefore, involves a judicial inquiry as to "the compatability of the substance of a law or governmental action with the Constitution." Id. at 417. See, e.g., Moore v.
City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499-500 (1977) (plurality decision); Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233-34 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 496-97 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring); Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-401 (1923).
Procedural due process requirements stem from the notion that an individual's life, liberty
or property may not be taken by a government entity without fair procedures. Thus, the government may not restrict a person's freedom to exercise fundamental constitutional rights
without providing a procedure to determine the fairness of that action. Judicial review involves
"assessment of a decisionmaking process that has determined that a specific individual should
suffer some burden" and may examine either the general fairness of a procedure authorized by
law or the fairness of a decision in a specific case. NOWAK & YOUNG, supra, at 416-17. See,
e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 649-51 (1972); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414
U.S. 632, 639-48 (1974); Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 549-51 (1965); May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533-34 (1953).
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tial status in custody determinations."
I.

THE HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF THE FAMILIAL LIBERTY
INTEREST

The United States Supreme Court, in a myriad of cases, has
held that the "freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and
family life is one of the liberties protected by the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment.' The Court has acknowledged a private "realm" of family life into which the state may not trespass. 26
While the right to family integrity is not specifically mentioned in
the Constitution, the Supreme Court has recognized a freedom of
choice with respect to child bearing,26 marriage, 7 and the right of
parents to rear and educate their children,28 under the fourteenth
amendment's umbrella of protection.29
Supreme Court cases upholding these rights can be divided into
two categories. The first line of cases stresses the liberty interest of
23. See N.Y. Soc. SERv.LAW § 383(6) (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985); N.Y. DOM. REL
LAW § 115-b(3)(d)(v) (McKinney 1977); FAM. Cr.AcT §§ 614(I)(e), 631 (McKinney 1983).
See, e.g., Bennett v. Jeffreys, 40 N.Y.2d 543, 356 N.E.2d 277, 387 N.Y.S.2d 821 (1976); In re
Anonymous (St. Christopher's Home), 40 N.Y.2d 96, 351 N.E.2d 707, 386 N.Y.S.2d 59
(1976); In re Orlando F., 40 N.Y.2d 103, 351 N.E.2d 711, 386 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1976). See infra
note 155.
New York does permit foster parents, who have cared for a child continuously for a period of 18 months, to apply to adopt the child. In this situation, they are given a preference
over all other adoption applicants. However, final determination of the adoption is within the
sole discretion of the court. See N.Y. SOc. SERv. LAW § 383(3) (McKinney 1983); N.Y. Soc.
SERV. LAW § 383(4) (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985).
24. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (plurality decision) (quoting Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974)). See, e.g., Santosky v.
Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982); Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); Cleveland
Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Prince
v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925);
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
25. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
26. Cleveland Ed. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973).
27. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
28. See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
29. The integrity of the family unit has also found protection in the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972)
(the denial to unwed fathers of a hearing on fitness which is accorded to all other parents in
custody determination proceedings is a denial of equal protection). The family is further protected by the ninth amendment. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 495-96 (1965)
(Goldberg, J., concurring) (the right to marital privacy is supported by the language and history of the ninth amendment).
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parents in the religious and educational training of their young.3°
The second category deals with the rights of parents to the care and
custody of their children."'
A.

Religious and Educational Training of Children

The United States Supreme Court has long recognized and upheld the right of parents to guide the religious and educational training of their young, as part of their fundamental right to rear their
children without arbitrary state interference. The first case to uphold
this liberty interest was Meyer v. Nebraska,32 where the Court acknowledged the right of parents to bring up their children without
undue interference by the state and invalidated a Nebraska statute
prohibiting foreign language instruction to school children. 33 The
Court noted that the parents' right to engage a foreign language instructor for their children evolved from the common law right to
"marry, establish a home and bring up children"3 4 and was a fundamental right of the individual, warranting constitutional protection. 35
In its decision, the Court rejected Nebraska's contention that the
statute was justified because it advanced the Americanization of its
foreign born population, and instead, emphasized the fundamental
right of parents to promote their individual cultural heritages, unfettered by arbitrary state restriction.36
Since Meyer, the Supreme Court has repeatedly reaffirmed the
parental right to guide the intellectual and religious development of
one's children. In Pierce v. Society of Sisters,37 the Court invalidated an Oregon statute which effectively compelled parents to send
their children to public, rather than educationally equivalent churchrun private schools, because the statute trespassed on the freedom of
parents to raise their children as they see fit.38 The Court rejected
the argument that the state had the authority to "standardize" its
young by forcing them to attend public learning institutions. Instead,
30. See infra notes 32-51 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 52-64 and accompanying text.
32. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
33. Id. In reversing the conviction of a German language teacher under the statute, the
Court upheld both the teacher's right to teach and the parents' right to hire him, as liberties
protected by the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 400.
34. Id. at 399.

35.

Id. at 399-400.

36.
37.
38.

Id. at 401-02.
268 U.S. 510 (1925).
Id. at 519, 534-35.
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the Court held that it was the parents' right to direct the course of
their children's education.39
The Supreme Court has permitted the state to interfere with
child-rearing decisions only under compelling circumstances and
with great reluctance. In Prince v. Massachusetts,4° the Court sustained the conviction of a Jehovah's Witness for permitting her
young niece to distribute pamphlets for her religious sect.4 1 Although
the aunt claimed that her conviction violated her right, as the child's
custodian, to rear her and teach her the tenets of her religion,4 2 the
Court held that the aunt, by violating a child labor law prohibiting
solicitation in the streets, jeopardized the psychological and physical
44
well-being of her niece.4 3 It found that the state's parens patriae
interest in the welfare of the child justified its usurpation of the parent's authority in this instance. The Court, however, emphasized its
reluctance as a general matter to intervene in a family's private life
and noted that the care and custody of the child rests primarily with
4
the parent. 5
The Supreme Court, in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 46 reemphasized its
reluctance to tamper with parental decisionmaking. The Court thus
limited its holding in Prince to those situations where a substantial
danger to the health and well-being of the child or to society exists.' 7
In Yoder, the Court affirmed the reversal of the conviction of Amish
parents who, on religious grounds, had refused to send their children
to school past the eighth grade, thereby violating state compulsory
39. Id. at 534-35.
40. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
41. Id. at 171. In holding that her first amendment right to freedom of religion was not
violated in this case, the Supreme Court balanced Mrs. Prince's parental right, under the
fourteenth amendment's Due Process Clause, to rear her ward as she saw fit, with the wellbeing and safety of the child. Id. at 166-67.
42. Id. at 164.
43. Id. at 170.
44. The parens patriae power stems from the state's interest in a healthy, educated and
moral populace, and permits the state to exercise guardianship powers over minors when the
parent fails to exercise his own authority. Note, supra note 16, at 69. See Ex parte Daedler,
194 Cal. 320, 324-25, 228 P. 467, 469-70 (1924); Smith v. Lascaris, 106 Misc.2d 1044, 104647, 432 N.Y.S.2d 995, 997-98 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1980); Rodham, Children Under the Law, in
THE RIGHTS OF CHILDREN 3-4 (1974). The state may also limit parental control in the interests of justifiable punishment of the child or an overriding state interest. Rodham, supra, at 4.
See G. MELTON, CHILD ADVOCACY 2, 28, 41 (1983).
45. Prince, 321 U.S. at 166.
46. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
47. Id. at 233-34.
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education laws. 8 In its decision, the Court emphasized that the lack
of a formal high school education would not be deleterious to the
Amish children.49 While the Court acknowledged that the state's interest in educating its youth was strong, it held that such interest
must, in view of the unique religious lifestyle of the Amish people,
yield to the fundamental rights of parents to control the religious
and educational training of their children. 0 With respect to these
fundamental parental rights, the Court stated that "[t]he history
and culture of Western civilization reflect a strong tradition of parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of their children. This
primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is now
established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition. ' ' 1
Thus, the Supreme Court has consistently reaffirmed the fundamental right of parents to raise their children in a manner consistent
with their own beliefs and heritage, unfettered by undue state
intrusion.
B.

The Care and Custody of One's Children

In a second line of cases dealing with family life, the Court has
held that the right of parents to the custody and companionship of
their own children is worthy of constitutional protection. In order to
safeguard this "cognizable and substantial" 52 parental right, the Supreme Court has afforded procedural due process protection to indi53
viduals whose parental status is jeopardized.
In May v. Anderson,54 the Supreme Court held that a mother's
right to the care and custody of her children was entitled to procedural due process protection. 55 The Court noted that "[r]ights far
48.

Id. In holding the convictions to be invalid under the free exercise clause of the first

amendment, the Supreme Court emphasized that the fundamental right of parents to rear
their children was also at issue. Id.
49. Id. at 222, 234.

50. Id. at 234-36.
51.

Id. at 232.

52. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 652 (1972).
53. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645
(1972); Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965); May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953).
The right to procedural due process stems from the Court's recognition that a fundamental
constitutional right is in some way being impinged upon. See supra note 22.
54. 345 U.S. 528 (1953).
55. Id. at 533. The Court refused to uphold the Supreme Court of Ohio's grant of full
faith and credit to a Wisconsin decree awarding custody to the father, since the decree was
issued when the mother was neither domiciled in, nor a resident of, Wisconsin; the Court held

that Wisconsin lacked in personam jurisdiction over the mother. Id. at 534-35.
In making its determination, the United States Supreme Court did not specifically refer to
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than property rights" are at stake when the right

to custody is at issue. 56 Similarly, in Armstrong v. Manzo,57 the
Court held that a divorced natural father was entitled to procedural
due process of law before his ex-wife's new husband could legally
adopt his child. The Court asserted that the natural father was entitled to notice of the adoption proceedings, despite the fact that the
child was legally in the mother's custody.58 The Court held that the
failure to receive such notice violated the most basic requirements of
due process of law, since it would result in the permanent deprivation of parental status.59
In Stanley v. Illinois, ° an unwed father challenged the constitutionality of an Illinois law which made his children wards of the
state upon the death of their mother merely because he and the
mother had not been married. The Court explained that, absent a
hearing and proof of unfitness, a state could not separate any natural
parent from his or her children. 61 Thus, the Court held that an unwed father was entitled to a hearing on his fitness as a parent before
his children could be taken from him. 2 In striking down the law, the
Supreme Court ruled that the state's intervention before a hearing
was a violation of the father's due process rights,63 and noted that
the private interest involved, "that of a man in the children he has
sired and raised, undeniably warrants deference and ...
protection. 64
Protected family interests, however, are neither limitless nor
completely beyond state regulation. As the Supreme Court asserted
in Prince, "[a]cting to guard the general interest in youth's well being, the state as parens patriae may restrict the parent's control by
requiring school attendance, regulating or prohibiting the child's lathe due process

clause. However, the Court has cited this case as authority for the recognition
of procedural due process principles, see, e.g., Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for
Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 842 and n.47 (1977); Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545,
550 (1965), and when acknowledging the importance of familial rights. See, e.g., Lassiter v.
Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981); Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S.
494, 499 (1977) (plurality decision); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972).
56. 345 U.S. at 533.
57. 380 U.S. 545 (1965).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 550.
60. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
61. Id. at 658.
62. Id. at 649.
63. Id. The Court also held that the denial of a hearing on fitness accorded to all other
parents, but denied to unwed fathers, was a denial of equal protection of the law. Id. at 658.
64. Id. at 651.
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bor and in many other ways." 6 5 As a result, the state may intervene

in the legal relationship between parent and child when a legitimate
purpose for such action exists. 6
No such purpose arises, however, merely because a "better"
home or parent can be found for a child. 67 Moreover, the right to
establish a home and raise children does not disappear merely because parents have not been exemplary custodians.68 As the Supreme
Court has stated:
We have little doubt that the Due Process Clause would be offended "[i]f a State were to attempt to force the breakup of a natural family, over the objections of the parents and their children,
without some showing of unfitness and for the sole reason that to
do so was thought to be in the children's best interest. ' 69

Thus, the mere fact that someone other than the parent could provide better surroundings or greater material advantages, or is better

qualified to raise a child, is not alone sufficient reason for the state to
separate a natural parent from his child.7 0 Under our legal system,
state interference for1 this reason alone would violate the basic tenets
7

of the Constitution.
Although the state's interest is limited, the state undeniably has

72
an interest in preserving and promoting the welfare of the child.

Consequently, when some parental act or omission triggers the inter-

est and concern of the state, the state may assert its parenspatriae
65.

321 U.S. at 166 (footnotes omitted).

66. Id. at 166-67; Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923).
Because the Court has repeatedly acknowledged that child bearing and rearing is a fundamental right, it has consistently afforded that right the utmost protection from unwarranted
state intrusion. See supra notes 24-64 and accompanying text.
67. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S.
246, 255 (1978); Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S.
816, 862-63 (1977) (Stewart, J., concurring).
68. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982).
69. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978) (quoting Smith v. Organization of
Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 862-63 (1977) (Stewart, J.,concurring)). For a discussion of the facts of Quilloin, see infra notes 112-119 and accompanying
text.
70. See Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978); Smith v. Organization of Foster
Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 862-63 (1977) (Stewart, J.,
concurring). See
also Bennett v. Jeffreys, 40 N.Y.2d 543, 549, 356 N.E.2d 277, 282, 387 N.Y.S.2d 821, 826
(1976). For a list of factors considered by courts in determining what is in the best interests of
the child, see supra note 4.
71. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402 (1923).
72. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766 (1982). See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205, 221, 229-30, 236 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166-67 (1944).
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authority.7 3 In particular, the state may intervene when a parent specifically consents to such action, 4 or the parent abuses or neglects
his child, 75 or is found to be unfit in some way.78 Even in such circumstances, a child may not be permanently separated from his par73. See Note, supra note 16, at 69; supra note 44.
74. See In re Revette, 97 Misc. 2d 699, 413 N.Y.S.2d 945 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1977), afd,
65 A.D.2d 920, 411 N.Y.S.2d 213 (1978).
75. See, e.g., In re Charlotte II, 98 A.D.2d 859, 471 N.Y.S.2d 156 (1983) (permanent
neglect of child); Monroe v. Blum, 90 A.D.2d 572, 456 N.Y.S.2d 142 (1982) (excessive corporal punishment of child warrants state reporting in central register of child abuse and maltreatment); In re Janet A.A., 88 A.D.2d 670, 450 N.Y.S.2d 922 (1982) (permanent neglect of
children); In re Tashyne L., 53 A.D.2d 629, 384 N.Y.S.2d 472 (1976) (child abuse).
76. Foster & Freed, supra note 4, at 427-28. To determine whether a parent is unfit the
courts generally consider a number of factors including moral character and emotional stability. Id. In making their determination, the courts look to see if the parent "has been convicted
of crime, has been cruel or violent towards members of the family, has been guilty of desertion, abandonment, or failure to support, has been mentally ill or has stipulated or contracted
for a relinquishment of custody." Id. at 428. See, e.g., In re Jason Y.Y., 89 A.D.2d 930, 453
N.Y.S.2d 957 (1982) (mother's mental illness posed imminent danger of neglect to her children); In re Michael J.M., 61 A.D.2d 1056, 402 N.Y.S.2d 473 (1978) (evidence of antisocial
behavior, including criminal solicitation and physical abuse of child, supported finding of unfitness); In re Jennifer S., 69 Misc.2d 951, 333 N.Y.S.2d 79 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 1972) (child held to
be abandoned after mother's five year absence). See also Custody of a Minor, 383 Mass. 595,
421 N.E.2d 63 (1981) (mother's psychological differences with son supported findings of unfitness); In re Cleaves, 6 A.D.2d 138, 175 N.Y.S.2d 736 (1958) (father's lack of parental affection and concern is evidence of unfitness).
In New York, unless the parent has voluntarily surrendered his child to the state's custody, the state may not permanently sever the parent-child relationship absent a showing by
clear and convincing evidence (N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW § 384-b(3)(g) (McKinney 1983)) that
(I) both parents are dead and no guardian has been lawfully appointed; (2) the parent has
abandoned the child for a period of at least six months; (3) the parent by reason of mental
illness or retardation is unable to now or in the foreseeable future provide appropriate care for
the child (and the child has already been in state care for a period of a year); or (4) the parent
has severely or repeatedly abused the child (and the child has been in the care of an authorized agency for one year). Parental rights may also be terminated if the child is permanently
neglected. N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW § 384-b(4)(a)-(e) (McKinney 1983). As defined in the New
York statute, a permanently neglected child is one who has been in the care of an authorized
agency, and whose parent has substantially failed for more than one year to maintain contact
with or plan for the child's future, while physically and financially able to do so. N.Y. Soc.
SERv. LAW § 384-b(7)(a) (McKinney 1983).
In cases evolving from private rather than state placements, and dealing only with custody, rather than permanent termination of parental rights, New York courts may, on a showing that extraordinary circumstances exist, allow custody to remain with a nonparent if it is in
the best interests of the child. Such extraordinary circumstances include "a judicial finding of
surrender, abandonment, unfitness, persistent neglect, unfortunate or involuntary extended disruption of custody, or other equivalent but rare extraordinary circumstance which would drastically affect the welfare of the child." Bennett v. Jeffreys, 40 N.Y.2d 543, 549, 356 N.E.2d
277, 283, 387 N.Y.S.2d 821, 827 (1976). Once extraordinary circumstances are found, the
court must then make the disposition that is in the best interests of the child. Id. at 548, 387
N.Y.S.2d at 826.
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ents unless the state supports its allegations by at least a clear and
convincing standard of proof.77
Thus, the parent's right to the care and custody of his or her
children is one of the most precious liberties protected by the fourteenth amendment.78 Barring a strong countervailing interest, the

state may not intervene in the parent-child relationship

9

despite the

existence of a more qualified parent or better home environment for

the child.80 Only after the parent has failed to exercise his authority
and duty, can the state's interest in the welfare of the child give rise

to its parens patriae power to intervene in the child's behalf.8 " Even
then, the Supreme Court requires that the justification for permanently terminating the parent's rights be proven by a clear and con82
vincing standard of proof.

If the grandmother in Peter L. had been the natural mother of

the child, her relationship with him would have been worthy of constitutional protection, and her presumptive claim to his custody
would have been given deference by the court.8 3 Because she was one

generation removed, however, the court was able to ignore her familial status. As a result, believing it to be in the best interests of the
child, the family court permitted his adoption by an undetermined4
stranger, despite the fact that the grandmother had been found fit

and had enjoyed a mutually loving relationship with her grandson.8 5
77. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982). In Santosky, the Supreme Court rejected
the use of a fair preponderance of the evidence standard in parental rights termination proceedings. Id. at 747. The state sought to terminate permanently the parental rights to three
children who had previously been removed from their home and placed in foster care. Id. at
751. The Court noted that the fair preponderance of the evidence standard used in New York
State parental rights termination proceedings was not constitutionally sufficient to protect the
parents' fundamental liberty interest in the care and custody of their children. The Court
stated that such liberty interest does not disappear merely because the parents have lost temporary custody of their children. Id. at 753. In fact, the Court declared that such parents have
an even "more critical need for procedural protections than do those resisting state intervention into ongoing family affairs." Id. Therefore, it ordered that the state prove its case by clear
and convincing evidence when enmeshed in a parental rights termination proceeding. Id. at
769-70.
78. See supra notes 24-77 and accompanying text.
79. See supra notes 52-77 and accompanying text.
80. See supra notes 67-71 and accompanying text.
81. See supra note 44; supra notes 72-77 and accompanying text.
82. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747-48 (1982). See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
83. See supra notes 24-77 and accompanying text.
84. As reported in In re Peter L., 92 A.D.2d 853, 853-54, 460 N.Y.S.2d 578, 579, rev'd,
59 N.Y.2d 513, 520-21, 453 N.E.2d 480, 483, 466 N.Y.S.2d 251, 254 (1983).
85. See supra notes 1-14 and accompanying text.
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An unanswered question is whether the protection of the due process
clause extends beyond the parent and child relationship, to encompass other family members, and more particularly, whether it encompasses grandparents' rights.
C. Extending the Liberty Interest Beyond the Nuclear Family
The Supreme Court has, in its commitment to preserving the
integrity and sanctity of the family, shown a willingness to protect
extended family relationships. 6 The Court has accepted an enlarged
definition of "family" when to do so will nurture and protect established familial and cultural bonds. Thus, while the extent of the liberty guaranteed by the due process clause of the fourteenth amend87
ment is not specifically delineated anywhere in the Constitution,
the Court has determined the limits of such protection, not by drawing arbitrary boundaries, but by considering the sanctity of the family among the values and traditions that are sacred to American
society. 88
As far back as Pierce v. Society of Sisters,89 the Court upheld
the right of both parents and guardiansto bring up and educate the
children in their charge 0° Moreover, in Prince v. Massachusetts,91
the Court recognized a liberty interest, despite the fact that the
party asserting the interest was an aunt and custodian.9 2 Thus, the
Court assessed the appropriate boundaries of her liberty interest by
the same standards the Court applies to the parent-child
relationship. 3
86. See, e.g., Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 504-05 (1977); Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). Accord
Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 843-45
(1977).
87. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 501-02 (1977) (plurality decision). See
supra note 16.
88. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503-04 (1977) (plurality decision). See
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639
(1968); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 495-96 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
89. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
90. Id. at 534-35. Accord Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 505 (1977); id.
at 511 (Brennan, J., concurring).
91. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
92. Id. at 159, 164. Accord Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality &
Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 843 n.49 (1977); Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 505
n.15 (1977); id. at 511 (Brennan, J., concurring).
93. 321 U.S. at 164. While the Court in Prince held that the aunt's actions jeopardized
the well-being of her niece, id. at 169-70, it nevertheless acknowledged the rights of parents
and custodians to rear their children without undue state interference. Id. at 166. See supra
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The Supreme Court, in Moore v. City of East Cleveland,94 reaffirmed its commitment to the integrity of the family unit by holding
that under certain circumstances, the constitutional protection of the
family reaches beyond the constraints of the nuclear family and encompasses the grandparental relationship. In Moore, the Court reversed the criminal conviction of a grandmother, who was living with
and caring for her son and two grandchildren, in violation of a housing ordinance that limited the permissible categories of relatives who
could live together in one dwelling.95 The Court rejected the city's
contention that protected liberty interests were limited to the nuclear
family.96 Instead, the Court found that such a curtailment of substantive due process imposed an "arbitrary boundary. ' 97 Itstated
that limits on due process must derive from a careful "respect for
the teachings of history [and] solid recognition of the basic values
that underlie our society," 98 and noted that our most cherished
moral and cultural values are passed down through family
relationships. 9
Although the Court acknowledged that the number of extended
households has decreased in modern society, it nevertheless concluded that the concept of family still extends beyond the nuclear
family. 100 The Court pointed out that in times of adversity, the family tends to unite to maintain or resurrect a secure home life, and
that the choice by relatives to live together cannot be easily denied
by the state. 101 Justice Brennan, in his concurrence, noted that the
extended family is still a vital living pattern, especially among ethnic
and racial minority groups. 02 He described familial associational
rights as "central" to many members of America's populace. 10 3 The
Court concluded that "[tihe tradition of uncles, aunts, cousins, and
especially grandparents sharing a household along with parents and
children has roots equally venerable and equally deserving of constinotes 40-45 and accompanying text.
94. 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (plurality decision).
95. Id. at 499.
96. Id. at 500-01. The Supreme Court has defined the nuclear family as consisting of
"essentially a couple and their dependent children." Id. at 500.
97. Id. at 502.
98. Id. at 503 (footnote omitted) (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 501
(1965) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
99. Id. at 503-05.
100. Id. at 504-05.
101. Id. at 505-06.
concurring).
102. Id. at 507-11 (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
103. Id. at 510 (Brennan, J.,
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tutional recognition."1 4
The Supreme Court has also indicated that the reach of the familial liberty interest may extend to biologically unrelated foster
families, where emotional ties analogous to those between natural
parent and child exist. In Smith v. Organization of Foster Families
For Equality & Reform, °5 foster parents claimed a familial liberty
interest in their foster families, and brought an action in New York
alleging that the procedures used to remove children from foster
homes violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.10° The Court decided the case on narrower grounds,1 07 but did
not reject the notion that the foster family might, under appropriate
circumstances, claim a limited liberty interest in the foster family. 108
The Court acknowledged that such an interest was limited, at best,
and held that it would, by necessity, be substantially curtailed when
the purpose of the child's removal was to return him to his natural
parents.' 09 Yet, significantly, the Court's opinion acknowledged that
the biological relationship encompasses only one definition of the
family, and asserted that "[n]o one would seriously dispute that a
deeply loving and interdependent relationship between an adult and
a child in his or her care may exist even in the absence of blood
relationship."110
Indeed, it is the familial commitment and the relationship between the custodian and the child that seems to be of paramount
importance in the Supreme Court's determination of whether a lib104. Id. at 504.
105. 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
106. Id. at 819-20. The foster parents argued that foster children should not be removed
from their foster homes without a prior hearing satisfying due process requirements. The
Court ruled, however, that even assuming the foster parents had a valid liberty interest, the
removal procedures used by the state were not defective. Id. at 847.
107. Id. at 847. Because the Court ruled that the procedures used by the state adequately protected any possible liberty interest foster parents could claim in the integrity of the
foster family, it found it unnecessary to resolve the complex questions raised by the foster
parents in this case. Id.
108. Id. at 846-47.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 844 (footnote omitted). Thus, the Court refused to dismiss the foster family
as a "mere collection of unrelated individuals." Id. at 844-45 (citation omitted). The Court
stated:
At least where a child has been placed in foster care as an infant, has never known
his natural parents, and has remained continuously for several years in the care of
the same foster parents, it is natural that the foster family should hold the same
place in the emotional life of the foster child, and fulfill the same socializing functions, as a natural family.
Id. at 844 (footnote omitted).
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erty interest worthy of protection exists."' This was resoundingly
emphasized in Quilloin v. Walcott,11 2 where the Supreme Court upheld the decision of a Georgia court to permit the adoption of an
illegitimate child by the mother's husband despite the objections of
the child's natural father. While seemingly a harsh decision for the
natural parent, it is consistent with the Court's firm commitment to
the preservation of established family ties, and is a clear example of

the kind of relationship the Court seeks to promote and protect
under the due process clause.

In Quilloin, the biological father had not been adjudicated unfit
and had not surrendered his rights in the child." He argued that,
therefore, he was entitled to the preservation of his parental rights

and that, absent his permission, no adoption could occur. 114 The Supreme Court, however, held that because of the meager relationship
that existed between the natural father and his son, the state had
15
only to find that the adoption was in the best interests of the child.

The Court noted that the father never had, nor sought, custody of
the child, and, in addition, had never assumed any significant responsibility for the care, education, or protection of his child.'1 6 Moreover, the Court noted that this was not a case where the proposed
adoption would place the child in a new home.1 7 Rather, the adoption would merely "give full recognition to a family unit already in
existence" for many years. 1 8 The Court consequently found the

countervailing interests of the established adoptive family superior to
those of the natural father." 9 The decision thus lends further sup111.

Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978). See Smith v. Organization of Foster

Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
112. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
113. Id. at 254.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 255.
116. Id. at 256.
117. Id. at 255.
118. Id. The child was born out-of-wedlock in December, 1964 and had been in his
mother's custody for the entire 11 years of his life. She was married in September, 1967, and,
during the initial period of this marriage, the child lived with his grandmother. The child had,
however, lived with his mother and stepfather from 1969 until the filing of the petition for
adoption in 1976. Id. at 247.
119. Id. at 255-56. The principles enunciated in Quilloin were recently reaffirmed in
Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983). In Lehr, as in Quilloin, a biological father asserted
that the adoption of his illegitimate child by the biological mother's husband violated his constitutional liberty interest in the child. Id. at 255. He claimed that the New York statutory
scheme was constitutionally deficient because it did not give him notice and an opportunity to
be heard prior to granting the adoption order. Id. The Supreme Court, however, found that the
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port to the notion that closely established family ties warrant judicial
protection.
Consistent with the Supreme Court's commitment to the protection of established familial relationships, the Second Circuit, in a
recent case, Rivera v. Marcus,120 upheld the rights of extended family members to due process protection in custody proceedings. In Rivera, a foster mother, who was also the half sister of her foster children, successfully contested the decision of the state foster agency in
Connecticut to summarily remove the children from her home where
they had lived for six years. 12 1 Mrs. Rivera asserted a liberty interest
in preserving the integrity of her foster family unit.1 2 2 The state of
Connecticut argued that, by signing a foster care agreement specifically giving the State Welfare Department the right to remove the
children at any time, Mrs. Rivera had waived any possible constitutional right that she might have had.1 23 The court disagreed, stating
that " 'courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver'
of fundamental constitutional rights ....
The court explained that Mrs. Rivera's situation differed substantially from the typical foster case, where the family relationship
New York statutes, which provided notice to seven categories of putative fathers, adequately
protected the natural father's "interest in establishing a relationship" with his child. Id. at
265.
In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court noted that Mr. Lehr had not registered with
the putative registry which would have ensured his notification. Moreover, the Court pointed to
the fact that this father, like the father in Quilloin, had never lived with or provided for his
child. The Court observed that:
[w]hen an unwed father demonstrates a full commitment to the responsibilities of
parenthood by "com[ing] forward to participate in the rearing of his child," his
interest in personal contact with his child acquires substantial protection under the
due process clause. At that point it may be said that he "act[s] as a father toward

his children." But the mere existence of a biological link does not merit equivalent
constitutional protection.
Id. at 261 (quoting Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 392 (1974)). Thus, the Supreme
Court found the natural father's claim without merit. Id. at 265.
120. 696 F.2d 1016 (2d Cir. 1982).
121. Id. at 1018, 1028. Six years before, the children's mother, suffering from psychological problems, had moved herself and her children into Mrs. Rivera's home. From that time
on, Mrs. Rivera had assumed the parental role and had continually been fully responsible for
the children's well-being and development. Id.
Two years after moving to Mrs. Rivera's home, the children's natural mother was committed to a mental institution. At that time the juvenile court stepped in and transferred legal
custody to the State Welfare Department. Mrs. Rivera then consented to a Welfare Department request to serve as foster parent. Id.
122. Id. at 1020.
123. Id. at 1026.
124. Id. (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)) (footnotes omitted).
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is strictly state created and there is potential for conflict between the
natural and foster parents.12 5 It pointed out that the natural parents
were no longer concerned parties, and that the children had lived
with Mrs. Rivera for several years.1 26 Most significantly, the court
emphasized that the children were related biologically to Mrs. Rivera. 127 Comparing Mrs. Rivera's situation to that of the grandmother in Moore v. City of East Cleveland,1 28 the court found no
distinction between them since both women were perpetuating the
"laudable" American tradition of providing a home for their needy
extended family members.1 29 Accordingly, the court found that Mrs.
Rivera had a liberty interest in preserving her familial relationship
with the children, and ruled that she be provided all necessary procedural safeguards to protect her rights, 13 0 so that the "extended family relationship would not be abruptly severed by the awesome power
of the state."1 3
The Supreme Court has consistently supported and protected
the integrity of the family, and has shown flexibility when delineating the limits of that protection.1 32 In addition, the Court has
demonstrated a willingness to extend constitutional protection beyond the parent-child relationship in order to preserve the familial
heritage and safeguard established familial ties.' 33 In light of these
objectives, it seems particularly appropriate to extend the liberty interest to grandparents who are seeking to prevent state sanctioned
adoption of their grandchildren by strangers, and who wish to keep
their families together and provide a permanent home for their
grandchildren.
D.

Grandparentsand Grandchildren-

A Special Bond

The relationship between loving grandparents and grandchildren can be a genuinely special one. As the highest court of New
Jersey has observed, "[i]t is a biological fact that grandparents are
125. Id. at 1024.
126. Id. At the time of the proceeding, the natural mother was not expected to leave the
mental institution where she had resided for more than 10 years. The natural father had
shown no interest in the children in over 12 years. Id.
127. Id.
128. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
129. 696 F.2d at 1025.
130. Id. at 1028.
131. Id. at 1030 (Kaufman, J., concurring).
132. See supra notes 24-131 and accompanying text.
133. See supra notes 86-131 and accompanying text.
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bound to their grandchildren through unbreakable links of heredity.

It is common human experience that the concern and interest grandparents take in the welfare of their grandchildren far exceeds any-

thing explicable in purely biological terms.

' 13 4

Indeed, such 'com-

mon human experience' is supported by the research of social

scientists who have noted
35

the significance of this special

relationship.1

In recognition of this important familial relationship, the right
of grandparents to visit with their grandchildren has been acknowledged by the United States Congress 36 and protected in many state

courts

37

and legislatures. 1' In a resolution, Congress expressed its

desire to develop a uniform state act that would provide grandpar-

ents with an adequate means of maintaining ties with their
grandchildren.139 The resolution specifically called for a uniform act
whose provisions would provide grandparents with adequate rights to

petition state courts for visitation. Such an act would ensure that
rights were extended in cases where the parents remarry and stepparents adopt the grandchildren, and would also establish procedures

for interstate recognition and enforcement of state court orders
140
granting such visitation privileges.
In addition to the federal resolution, forty-nine state legislatures
134.
135.

Mimkon v. Ford, 66 N.J. 426, 431, 332 A.2d 199, 204 (1975).
See, e.g., Attneave, American Indians and Alaska Native Families: Emigrants in
Their Own Homeland, in ETHNICITY AND FAMILY THERAPY 55, 72-73 (M. MeGoldrick, 3.
Pearce, J. Giordano eds. 1982); Langelieri, French Canadian Families, in ETHNICITY AND
FAMILY THERAPY 229, 243 (M. McGoldrick, J.Pearce, J. Giordano eds. 1982); Rotunno and
McGoldrick, Italian Families, in ETHNICITY AND FAMILY THERAPY 340 (M. McGoldrick, J.
Pearce, J. Giordano eds. 1982); Welts, Greek Families, in ETHNICITY AND FAMILY THERAPY
269, 276-77 (M. McGoldrick, J.Pearce, J. Giordano eds. 1982); Walsh, The Family in Later
Life, in THE FAMILY LIFE CYCLE 197, 203-05 (E.A. Carter and M. McGoldrick eds. 1980);
Bradt, The Family With Young Children, in THE FAMILY LIFE CYCLE 121, 135-37 (E.A.
Carter and M. McGoldrick eds. 1980); S. LIEBERMAN, TRANSGENERATIONAL FAMILY THERAPY 51-52 (1979); I. BOSZORMENYI-NAGY, INVISIBLE LOYALTIES: RECIPROCITY IN INTERGENERATIONAL FAMILY THERAPY 224-27 (1973); Grandparents: The Other Victims of Divorce and Custody Disputes, 1982: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Human Services of the
Select Comm. on Aging, House of Representatives, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 50 (1982) (statement
by psychiatrist, Dr. Arthur Kornhaber).
136. H.R. Con. Res. 45, 98th Cong., Ist Sess., 129 CONG. REC. 2127 (1983).
137. See, e.g., In re Robert D., 151 Cal. App.3d 391, 198 Cal. Rptr. 801 (1984); Mirto
v. Bodine, 29 Conn. Supp. 510, 294 A.2d 336 (Conn. C.P. 1972); Skeens v. Paterno, 60 Md.
App. 48, 480 A.2d 820 (1984); Mimkon v. Ford, 66 N.J. 426, 332 A.2d 199 (1975); Layton v.
Foster, 61 N.Y.2d 747, 460 N.E.2d 1351, 472 N.Y.S.2d 916 (1984).
138. See infra note 141.
139. H.R. Con. Res. 45, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. 2127 (1983).
140. Id.
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have now passed statutes that permit grandparent visitation.1 4'
While their terms may vary, they generally enable grandparents to

petition state courts for visitation privileges with their grandchildren
after their own child's marriage has been dissolved through death or
divorce.

142

Similarly, state courts have shown a commitment to the preservation of this important familial relationship. 43 In the leading case
44
of Mimkon v. Ford,1
the New Jersey Supreme Court upheld the
maternal grandparents' right to visit their deceased daughter's child,

against the wishes of the natural father and his second wife who had
legally adopted the child. In Layton v. Foster,14 5 the New York

Court of Appeals similarly upheld the paternal grandparents' right
to visit their grandson over the objection of the child's mother and
adoptive father, even though the natural father had consented to the
141. ALA. CODE § 30-3-4 (1983); ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150 (1983); ARIz. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 25-337.01 (1984-1985 Supp.); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1211.2 (1985 Supp.); CAL CiV.
CODE § 197.5 (West 1982); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-1-116 (1984 Supp.); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 46b-59 (West 1984 Supp.); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10 § 950(7) (1984 Supp.); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 61.13(2)(b)2c (West 1985 Supp.); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-3 (1985 Supp.); HAWAII
REV. STAT. § 571-46(7) (1984 Supp.); IDAHO CODE § 32-1008 (1983); ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 40,
§ 607(b) (Smith-Hurd 1985 Supp.); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-11.7 (West 1985-1986 Supp.);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.35 (We st 1985 Supp.); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-129 (1984 Supp.); Ky.
REV. STAT. § 405.021 (Bobbs-Merrill 1984); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:572 (West 1985 Supp.);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 752.6 (1984-1985 Supp.); MD. FAm. LAW CODE ANN. § 9-102
(1984); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 39D (West 1985 Supp.); MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN.
§ 722.27(g) (West 1985 Supp.); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.022 (West 1982); MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 93-16-1 (1984 Supp.); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 452.400(3) and 452.402 (Vernon 1985 Supp.);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-9-102 (1983); NEV. REV. STAT. § 123.123 (1979); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 458:17 (VI) (1983); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-7.1 (West 1985 Supp.); N.M. STAT. ANN. §
40-9-2 (1983); N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 72 (McKinney 1977) and N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 240
(McKinney 1984 Supp.); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.50) (1984); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09.05.1
(1983 Supp.); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.11 (Page 1980); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10 § 5
(West 1984-1985 Supp.); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.121 (1981); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1001
(Purdon 1984-1985 Supp.); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-24.1 (1980 Supp.); S.C. CODE ANN. § 207-420(33) (1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-4-54 (1984 Supp.); TENN. CODE ANN. §
36-6-301 (1984); TEX. FAm. CODE ANN. § 14.03(e) (Vernon 1985 Supp.); UTAH CODE ANN. §
30-3-5(4) (1985 Supp.); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1011(a) (1985 Supp.); VA. CODE § 31-16
(1985); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.240 (1984-1985 Supp.); W. VA. CODE § 48-2-15
(1985 Supp.); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.245(4) (West 1981); Wyo. STAT. § 20-2-113(c) (1985
Supp.).
142. Zaharoff, Access to Children: Toward a Model Statute for Third Parties, 15 FAM.
L.Q. 165 (1981). See also Foster & Freed, Grandparents Visitation: Vagaries and Vicissitudes, 23 ST. Louis U.L.J. 643 (1979); Note, Statutory Visitation Rights of Grandparents:
One Step Closer to the Best Interests of the Child, 26 CATH. U.L. REV. 387 (1977).
143. See supra note 137.
144. 66 N.J. 426, 332 A.2d 199 (1975).
145. 61 N.Y.2d 747, 460 N.E.2d 1351, 472 N.Y.S.2d 916 (1984).
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adoption and no longer had any visitation rights. 146 Thus, courts
have demonstrated their commitment to preserving this special
source "of unconditional love and acceptance. "147
Although the protection afforded grandparents under state law
involves only their rights to visitation, and not custody, it appears
that the legislatures and the courts are committed to upholding and

preserving this special extended familial bond. 48 The state, therefore, contradicts its own professed recognition of the importance of
this relationship when it suddenly denies its significance where the
context changes from a question of visitation to one of custody and
adoption.
More importantly, the state's lack of protection for grandparents is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's willingness to extend
the liberty interest beyond the nuclear family.149 The Court has
broadened the liberty interest because of its respect for the integrity
of the family, its commitment to the preservation of family ties, and
its desire to encourage the passing down of familial heritage and traditions from one generation to the next.' 50 It seems only natural,
therefore, that when a loving and responsible grandparent seeks to
raise a parentless grandchild and, thereby, safeguard family ties, he
or she should be entitled to assert a liberty interest in the care and
custody of that child. To deny such a right is to fly in the face of the
values that the Supreme Court has steadfastly supported.','
146. Id. On August 24, 1984, family court Judge John D. Capilli ruled that grandparents may have the right to visit their grandchildren over the objections of their son and daughter-in-law in an intact family. In re Frances E., 125 Misc.2d 164, 479 N.Y.S.2d 319 (N.Y.
Fam. Ct. 1984).
147. Mimkon v. Ford, 66 N.J. 426, 431, 332 A.2d 199, 204 (1975).
148. See supra notes 136-47 and accompanying text.
149. See supra notes 86-133 and accompanying text.
150. See supra notes 86-133 and accompanying text.
151. Consequently, it seems that the grandmother's claim in Peter L. did indeed have
merit. She was seeking to do that which the Court, in Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S.
494 (1977), thought so very worthy of protection: To keep her family together in times of
adversity. Moreover, it is beyond dispute that a loving and caring relationship existed between
her and her grandson. The child had previously lived with his grandmother for two years, and,
even while in foster care, had visited with her. In re Peter L., 59 N.Y.2d 513, 517, 453 N.E.2d
480, 481, 466 N.Y.S.2d 251, 252 (1983). The court asserted that its findings did not "impugn
the sincerity or depth of her feeling for her grandson." Id. at 521, 453 N.E.2d at 483, 466
N.Y.S.2d at 254. In light of the grandmother's blood connection and deep emotional relationship with her grandson, it would seem that she had a constitutionally protected liberty interest
in the care and custody of Peter, and was entitled to the preferential status she asserted. See
supra notes 86-150 and accompanying text.
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PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS AND THE LIBERTY INTEREST

Once it has been determined that a claimed liberty interest falls
within the fourteenth amendment's protection, the question then becomes one of determining the procedural' protection that is due.Y2
After a court has found that a grandparent has a liberty interest in
the care and custody of a grandchild, it must then assess whether the
procedure used to terminate that interest is an adequate safeguard
against undue severance.
The Supreme Court, in Mathews v. Eldridge,15 3 listed the three
competing interests that must be balanced in assessing the adequacy
of procedural protection:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal
and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. 114
Resolution of the issue of whether a procedure is constitutionally sufficient requires an analysis under this three-part balancing test.
When the Eldridge criteria are applied, New York's standards for
evaluating a grandparent's claim to the care and custody of his or
her parentless grandchild prove to be unconstitutional. By refusing
them preferential status in custody proceedings, existing state law
places an unconstitutionally heavy burden on grandparents. 5 5 In In
152. See Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S.
816, 847 (1977); Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981).
153. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
154. Id. at 335 (citation omitted).
155. In New York, once a parent's rights have been terminated, there is no presumption
that the child's best interests will be enhanced by any particular placement. See supra note 18.
This approach is followed in a number of jurisdictions. See, e.g., Cox v. Stayton, 273 Ark. 298,
619 S.W.2d 617 (1981) (grandparents have no presumptive right of custody of their grandchildren); Graham v. Children's Servs. Div., 39 Or. App. 27, 591 P.2d 375 (1979) (grandparents
rights are not superior to those of non-relatives when applying for permission to adopt).
It is generally presumed throughout the nation that the child's best interests are served by
being in the natural parent's custody. See Bennett v. Jeffreys, 40 N.Y.2d 543, 547, 356 N.E.2d
277, 286, 387 N.Y.S.2d 821, 825 (1976); see also MCCAHEY & ZErr, supra note 4, at §
11.02. Indeed, the parent's legal right to his child is constitutionally protected. See supra notes
22-64 and accompanying text.
When a custody dispute arises between a parent and a non-parent, the "parental preference" rule generally requires that custody be awarded to the natural parent, unless that parent
is unfit or other extraordinary circumstances exist. See, e.g., Bennett v. Jeffreys, 40 N.Y.2d
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re Peter L., the court required that the grandmother prove not only
her fitness, but her ability to provide a "better adoptive home" than
that planned by the state. 156 Such a failure to provide adequate procedural protection of fundamental familial rights is violative of due
process.
A.

The Private Interest Affected

Applying the first Eldridge factor requires an examination of
the private interest affected by the official act. 157 When the state
equates the claim of an extended family member, such as a grandparent, with that of a stranger, 158 its action cuts to the very heart of
the family's being, and in the most profound way intrudes upon the
family's unity, integrity, and self-determination. 59 The relationship
between grandparent and grandchild is a special one. 160 In the absence of the natural parents, the interest of a grandparent in his or
her grandchild is even more compelling. Therefore, when the state
seeks to so severely intrude into the sanctity of the family, the grandparent's interest, like a parent's interest, in the accuracy and justice
of the proceeding is "commanding." '
543, 356 N.E.2d 277, 387 N.Y.S.2d 821 (1976); Yost v. Phillips, 21 Or. App. 464, 535 P.2d
94 (1975); Kridel v. Kridel, 85 N.J. Super. 478, 205 A.2d 316 (1968); MCCAHEY & ZETT,
supra note 4, at ch. 11. In New York, the parental right to rear one's own child is paramount,
except when such automatic rights are terminated through extraordinary circumstances, triggering the "best interests of the child" test. Bennett v. Jeffreys, 40 N.Y.2d 543, 546, 356
N.E.2d 277, 281, 387 N.Y.S.2d 821, 824-25 (1976). For a discussion of the criteria used in
evaluating the child's best interest, see supra note 4.
The degree of deference given to the parental status in disputes between parents and nonparents varies between states. For a discussion of these varying standards, see E. CLARK,
CASES AND PROBLEMS IN DoMESTic RELATIONS 886-87 (2d ed. 1974).
156. 59 N.Y.2d at 520, 453 N.E.2d at 483, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 254. See also Ninesling v.
Nassau County Dep't of Social Servs., 46 N.Y.2d 382, 389, 386 N.E.2d 234, 239, 413
N.Y.S.2d 626, 631 (1978) (foster parents must prove they would provide a better adoptive
home than that planned by the department or agency, and also bear the burden of showing
that a detrimental impact on the child would result from his removal from the foster home).
The court in Peter L. emphasized the fact that the grandmother had not lived with Peter for
eighteen months, and stated that her position was no better than that of a temporary foster
parent. 59 N.Y.2d at 520, 453 N.E.2d at 483, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 254. See supra note 8. The
court also noted that its requirement that she prove her home better than that planned by the
state was virtually impossible to satisfy. 59 N.Y.2d at 520, 453 N.E.2d at 483, 466 N.Y.S.2d
at 254.
157. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
158. See In re Peter L., 59 N.Y.2d 513, 520, 453 N.E.2d 480, 483, 466 N.Y.S.2d 251,
254 (1983).
159. See supra notes 24-133 and accompanying text.
160. See supra notes 136-47 and accompanying text.
161. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 759 (1982) (quoting Lassiter v. Depart-
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The grandparent's interest is still more compelling when one
considers the finality of the state's decision. Just as in parental rights
termination proceedings, 6 2 the state's decision in adoption proceed-

ings is generally irrevocable.16 3 Once the child is placed in an adoptive home, he or she is there to stay, and the state, in severing the

natural family's bonds, "will have worked a unique kind of deprivation. 1 64 In view of the power of the state to irreparably destroy this
private interest, there is an urgent need to erect stronger procedural

barriers in its defense.
B.

The Risk of Error

The second Eldridge factor, which examines the risk of an erroneous deprivation of a private interest, 6 5 compels an assessment of
the applicable standards now used by the New York courts. The
New York courts, by statutory mandate 6 and case law precedent, 6 7 base custody and adoption decisions solely upon the best interests of the child.' 68 Once a parent's rights have been forfeited,"6 9

there is generally no presumption that the best interests of the child
will be served by a particular disposition.17 0 Consequently, the state

has virtually unlimited discretion in making its custodial placements.
ment of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981)).
162. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747 (1982).
163. See N.Y. Dom. REL.LAW § 114 (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985) (stating that orders
of adoption may be set aside for fraud, newly discovered evidence, or other sufficient cause).
The legislature, in recent years, has indicated a strong desire to make adoption orders irrevocable. In 1972, it made consents of natural parents irrevocable in some circumstances. See N.Y.
Dom. REL. LAW § 115 (McKinney 1983). Moreover, in 1974, it repealed § 118 which provided
a procedure for the abrogation of adoption due to later occurrences. N.Y. Dora. REL LAW §
118- 18c (repealed 1974). Today, the public policy of the state dictates that final orders of
adoption "should not be lightly set aside." In re Kane, 104 Misc.2d 83, 85, 427 N.Y.S.2d 575,
578 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1980).
164. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 759 (1982) (quoting Lassiter v. Department of
Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981)).
165. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
166. See, e.g., N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW § 383(5) (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985); N.Y.
Dom. REL. LAW § 115-b(3)(d)(v) (McKinney 1977); N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT § 614(1)(e), 631
(McKinney 1983).
167. Bennett v. Jeffreys, 40 N.Y.2d 543, 356 N.E.2d 277, 387 N.Y.S.2d 821 (1976); In
re Anonymous (St. Christopher's Home), 40 N.Y.2d 96, 351 N.E.2d 707, 386 N.Y.S.2d 59
(1976); In re Orlando F., 40 N.Y.2d 103, 351 N.E.2d 711, 386 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1976).
168. See supra note 155 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the factors used to
determine what disposition is in the child's best interests, see supra note 4.
169. Parental rights are forfeited by "surrender, abandonment, unfitness, persisting neglect or other extraordinary circumstance." Bennett v. Jeffreys, 40 N.Y.2d 543, 548, 356
N.E.2d 277, 282, 387 N.Y.S.2d 821, 826 (1976).
170. Id. at 548, 356 N.E.2d at 283, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 826. See supra note 155.
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New York does give "preference and first consideration" to foster parents seeking to adopt a foster child who has lived with them
continuously for eighteen months and who is now eligible for adoption. 71 No preference or consideration, however, is extended to
grandparents seeking to override the state's decision to place their
grandchild in a non-relative's adoptive home. 172 While a grandparent-grandchild family relationship may be considered by the court, it
is by no means dispositive and can be disregarded, even when the
grandparent's loving concern for the child is acknowledged. 7 The
state may then show greater deference to a state-created relationship
than to the natural familial bonds which the Supreme
Court has
1 74
deemed crucial to the basic structure of our society.
In applying the "best interests of the child" standard, the court
is guided by societal values regarding family life. 5 Unfortunately,
such a standard is at best imprecise, and is affected considerably by
the subjective values of the judge.1 6 Where such imprecise standards are employed in making custodial decisions, there is an inherent danger that a court will undervalue pertinent facts that might
favor a particular party and may inadvertently make assessments
based on class or cultural bias. 7
These dangers are illustrated in Peter L., where both the family
court and the New York Court of Appeals were admittedly troubled
by the grandmother's apparent preoccupation with her son's
death.178 The family court reached its decision despite a psycholo171. N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW § 383(3) (McKinney 1983).
172. In re Peter L., 59 N.Y.2d 513, 516, 453 N.E.2d 480, 482, 466 N.Y.S.2d 251, 253
(1983).
173. See, e.g., In re Peter L., 59 N.Y.2d 513, 453 N.E.2d 480, 466 N.Y.S.2d 251
(1983).
174. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 504-05 (1977).
175. Bennett v. Jeffreys, 40 N.Y.2d 543, 549, 356 N.E.2d 277, 283, 387 N.Y.S.2d 821,
826 (1976).
176. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 762 (1982); Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 835 n.36 (1977). See generally X. KATZ,
WHEN PARENTS FAIL 69-82 (1971).
177. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 762-63 (1982); Smith v. Organization of Foster
Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 833-34 (1977). In Santosky, the Court stated
that in determining whether the parents failed to maintain contact with their child while in
foster care (as required by Fam. Ct. Act. § 614(1)(d)) a judge can discount actual visits on
the ground that they were insubstantial or overtly demonstrated a lack of parental affection
and concern as required by N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW § 384b(7)(b). Santosky, 455 U.S. at 763
n. 12. Moreover, the court noted that a judge may dismiss, as unrealistic, plans for the child's
future that are based on overly optimistic estimates of physical or financial ability, when considering whether the parent has planned for the child's future, as required by § 384b(7)(c). Id.
178. In re Peter L., 59 N.Y.2d 513, 521, 453 N.E.2d 480, 483, 466 N.Y.S.2d 251, 254
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gist's testimony that the grandmother's behavior was quite normal
for a woman from a traditional Greek background, and despite a
lack of evidence to indicate that her beliefs would be detrimental to
the boy's development. 17 9 Moreover, the boy's law guardian testified
that, in his opinion, placement with the grandmother would be in
Peter's best interests.1 80 The family court, however, chose to discount
these witnesses' assertions and, despite its own admission that the
grandmother was fit, found against her."8 ' Thus, a family member
may be unable to combat the court's subjective judgments.
Once a child is in the custody of Social Services, the state has
broad power to interpret the historical events that form the basis for
its decision, and has the "unusual ability to structure the evidence."112 In Santosky v. Kramer,l8 3 a case reviewing the adequacy
of a parental rights termination hearing, the parents claimed that
the state had sought orders denying them the right to visit their children while in foster care.18 Their failure to visit, resulting from
compliance with these orders, would have prevented them from
maintaining the contact required by the New York Family Court
Act. 8" Similarly, in Peter L., the family court that originally denied
the grandmother custody alluded to administrative red tape that had
hindered her from gaining custody of the boy, and acknowledged
that "[i]f there had been greater understanding by the agency of the
grandmother when the child was first placed, there might have been
a successful placement of the child in the grandmother's home long
ago." 1 6 Despite the questionable nature of the state's actions, the
87
family court denied custody to the grandmother.
Since the state's procedures do not require that deference be
given to extended family ties, the state has total discretion in placing
(1983).
179.

180.

As reported in In re Peter L., 92 A.D.2d 853, 855, 460 N.Y.S.2d 578, 580 (1983).

Id. See also Respondent's Brief at 7-8, In re Peter L., 59 N.Y.2d 513, 453 N.E.2d

480, 466 N.Y.S.2d 251 (1983).

181.

92 A.D.2d at 854, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 579. The court of appeals stated that, in light

of these facts, the family court's finding was appropriate. 59 N.Y.2d at 521, 453 N.E.2d at

483, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 254.
182.
183.
184.
185.

Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 763 & n.13 (1982).
455 U.S. 745 (1982).
Id. at 763.
Id. at 748-49.

186.

92 A.D.2d at 853-54, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 579. The family court did not clarify ex-

actly what problems had existed between the foster agency and the grandmother, but did ac-

knowledge that the state had interfered with the child's placement in her home. Id.
187. As reported in In re Peter L., 92 A.D.2d 853, 460 N.Y.S.2d 578, rev'd, 59 N.Y.2d
513, 453 N.E.2d 480, 466 N.Y.S.2d 251 (1983).
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the child. This intrusion into the family is precisely the kind of evil
the fourteenth amendment's protection was designed to prevent.118 It
is true that the hearing itself gives some procedural protection to the
grandparent's interest. However, without some preferential status or
presumption that the best interests of the child are served by his
being with a close family member such as a grandparent, the hearing alone provides inadequate protection against the personal values
of the decisionmaker.189 As the Supreme Court has stated, "[a] case
by case review cannot preserve fundamental fairness when a class of
proceedings is governed by a constitutionally defective . . . standard."1 90 In a Peter L.-type situation, the lack of a familial preference can result in inherently unfair proceedings.
C. The Government's Interest
The third Eldridge factor requires an examination of the government's interest and of any additional burdens that the government would have to bear because of changed procedures. 19' There is
no question that the state has a large stake in the outcome of child
disposition cases. It has a "parenspatriaeinterest in preserving and
promoting the welfare of the child.' 9 2 In addition, it has a "fiscal
and administrative interest in [minimizing] the cost and the burden
of such proceedings.' 9 3 According a grandparent a preferential
standing in a case where the natural parents are not involved, however, would not significantly interfere with either of these concerns.
The state, when acting in parens patriae, seeks the establishment of a permanent and suitable home for all displaced children. 94
This interest favors the preservation, not the severance, of natural
familial bonds. 9 5 The Supreme Court has repeatedly shown its commitment to the preservation of family ties. 196 Moreover, Congress
has articulated its desire to preserve established family ties wherever
possible. For example, section 608 of the Public Health and Welfare
188. See supra notes 24-31 and accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 165-87 and accompanying text.
190. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. at 757 (footnote omitted).
191.

Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).

192. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 766. See supra note 44; supra notes 72-77 and accompanying text.
193. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 766.
194.

See N.Y. SOC. SERv. LAW § 384-b(l)(a)(i)-(iv) (McKinney 1983). See also 42

U.S.C. § 608 (1982); Miller v. Youakim, 440 U.S. 125 (1979); supra notes 52-133 and accompanying text.
195. See supra notes 52-133 and accompanying text.
196.

Id.
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Act provides that services be allocated to improve the conditions in
the homes from which children have been removed in order to promote their return to the home, and alternatively, calls for a plan to
place the children in homes of relatives wherever feasible. 97 Significantly, New York law regarding custodial placements also specifically mandates that the state's first obligation is to provide families
with the necessary services to help keep them together, or to reunite
family members if a family breakup has already occurred. 19 8
It is difficult to understand, then, how a custodial placement
standard that so completely denigrates the familial relationship can
be reconciled with these professed concerns of the state. Since the
state promotes none of its admitted goals when it deliberately
removes children from the care of fit relatives, 9" the use of a stan200
dard that equates strangers and family members is inappropriate.
Requiring a presumption in favor of grandparents would cause almost no additional burden, either financially or administratively on
the state.
The New York Court of Appeals in Peter L. expressed concern
that, if all fit members of a child's extended family were recognized
as possessing a prior claim, based on a constitutional liberty interest,
the entire determination process would be made more complicated. 20 ' This fear, however, is largely unrealistic. The court already
20 2
permits interested persons to be made parties to such proceedings.
197.

42 U.S.C. § 608 (1982). In light of Congress' goals to preserve the family, the

Supreme Court ruled, in Miller v. Youakim, 440 U.S. 125 (1979), that the denial of support to
foster families comprised of blood relatives was contrary to its articulated desire to return
foster children to their families. Id. at 145. See also ATTORNEY GENERAL'S TASK FORCE ON
FAMILY VIOLENCE, FINAL REPORT 115 (Sept. 1984) (advocating consideration of grandparents

and other extended family members as possible guardians for children in the event of family
dissolution or dysfunction).
198. N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW § 384b(1)(a)(i)-(iv) (McKinney 1983).
199. Cf. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 767 (1982); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S.
645, 652 (1972).

200. It should be noted that New York not only fails to give preference to the familial
status of relatives challenging the state's adoptive plans, but may even require them to prove

that they would provide a better home than that planned by the state. See In re Peter L., 59
N.Y.2d 513, 520, 453 N.E.2d 480, 483, 466 N.Y.S.2d 251, 254 (1983).
201. In re Peter L., 59 N.Y.2d 513, 520, 453 N.E.2d 480, 482, 466 N.Y.S.2d 251, 253
(1983).
202. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 651(b) (McKinney 1983). The Act is silent as to the

parties who may initiate the proceeding. However, the courts have ruled that, by virtue of this
section, any person who has an interest in the welfare of a child has standing to sue for cus-

tody. See Smith v. Lascaris, 106 Misc.2d 1044, 1046, 432 N.Y.S.2d 995, 997 (N.Y. Fain. Ct.
1980); Humphrey v. Humphrey, 103 Misc.2d 175, 176-78, 425 N.Y.S.2d 759, 761 (N.Y.
Fam. Ct. 1980).
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More significantly, the assertion of a liberty interest would be
granted special consideration and protection only when a party could
demonstrate close familial bonds, analogous to those between parent
and child, in addition to the simple biological connection.20 3 The relatives who could successfully assert such a bond are likely to be few
in number. 04 Thus, there is no reason to believe that the granting of
preferential status to those asserting a liberty interest would significantly impact on the number of people seeking custody. While it
may be true that all relatives asserting a liberty interest would have
to relinquish their claims to the child before the state could legally
authorize an adoption by strangers, the additional effort and costs
involved would be minimal. Indeed, in light of the important personal rights involved, the administrative inconvenience seems
insignificant.
It should also be noted that the court, in affording a grandparent adequate procedural due process protection by a grant of presumptive status, would not abdicate its role as ultimate decisionmaker. The court would neither lose its determinative discretion
nor ignore the best interests of the child, simply by rebalancing the
scales on which it weighs its choices. Rather, the court would take
appropriate notice of the fundamental familial rights guaranteed by
the Constitution.
The Peter L. court, however, expressed an additional concern
that recognition of the right claimed by the grandparent would undermine the decision made by the natural parent to surrender voluntarily his or her custody to the state. 20 5 This is also an unrealistic
fear. When a parent surrenders custody, the state assumes the status
of parent in the decisionmaking process.206 It does not act as an
agent of the parent or require the parent's permission to approve its
choice of adoptive parents. 20 7 Consequently, it is impossible to under203. See Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978); Smith v. Organization of Foster
Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 842-45 (1977); supra notes 103-56 and accompanying text.
204. It would be up to the courts to determine which relatives, besides grandparents,
could assert the requisite relationship. This question, however, is beyond the scope of this
Note.
205. 59 N.Y.2d at 520, 453 N.E.2d at 482, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 254.
206. See N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 383(6) (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985); N.Y. Dom.
REL. LAW § I Il(l)(f) (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985).
207. See N.Y. Dora. REL LAW § 1lI(l)(f) (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985). Natural parents may, in some circumstances, revoke or annul their surrender agreements. N.Y. Soc. SERv.
LAW § 383(6) (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985). Although the natural parents may be fit, competent and able to care for the child, they have no superior right of custody, and custody thereaf-

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol13/iss2/4

30

19851

Kotkin: Grandparents Versus the State: A Constitutional Right to Custody
GRANDPARENTS CUSTODY

mine the natural parent, since he or she has already relinquished all
rights in and responsibilities to the child.
Balancing the interests of family unity and self-determination
against the risks of error in the current placement process, it is clear
that change is needed. Recognition of a grandparent's constitutionally protected liberty interest in the custody determination would not
require radical changes in the placement process nor significantly increase the costs of such procedures. The government's interest in
providing children with loving families cannot be furthered by denying them a home with loving and fit family members. Indeed, the
state's interest is served when a warm and loving family member is
available to provide a permanent home for a parentless child.
CONCLUSION

The institution of the family is deeply woven into the fabric of
our society and is fundamental to our way of life. The Supreme
Court has repeatedly affirmed its respect for the integrity of the family. 20 8 It has staunchly supported the right of parents to rear and
educate their children as they see fit, and has often acknowledged
the right of parents and children to be together. 9 Moreover, the
Court has expressed a willingness to extend the liberty interest beyond the natural parents, when to do so will preserve a secure family
life. 210
Consequently, in the absence of the natural parents, grandparents should be able to assert a constitutionally protected liberty interest in the care and custody of their grandchildren. When parents
are no longer able to maintain a secure home for their children, it is
natural and fitting that other family members should be able to step
in to keep the family together and protect its traditions and heritage
from undue severance by the state.
In light of this liberty interest, grandparents are entitled to adequate procedural safeguards before they may be denied custody in
favor of a "stranger" selected by a childcare agency. These guaranteed protections, however, are seemingly not afforded in the New
York family courts today. Grandparents must meet the same stanter is awarded solely on the basis of the child's best interests. N.Y. Soc. SERv.
(McKinney Supp. 1984-1985).
208. See supra notes 24-120 and accompanying text.
209. See supra notes 24-51 and accompanying text.
210. See supra notes 86-120 and accompanying text.
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dards applied to any stranger seeking custody. 21' They have the unduly heavy burden of proving, not only that they are fit, but also that
they will provide a better home than that planned by the agency a task that the New York
Court of Appeals has acknowledged is
"virtually impossible. 212 This requirement disregards the importance of family ties, and thereby violates the sanctity of the family,
which is protected by the fourteenth amendment. New York should
amend its determination procedures, to ensure that grandparents are
given the deference and protection their status requires.
Roberta Kotkin

211.
212.
(1983).

See supra note 155.
In re Peter L., 59 N.Y.2d 513, 520, 453 N.E.2d 480, 483, 466 N.Y.S.2d 251, 254

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol13/iss2/4

32

